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Abstract:  Well  Founded Semantics is shown adequate to capture hypothetical 
reasoning  if  we interpret the Well  Founded model  of  a program  P  as a (possibly 
incomplete)  view of  the world. Thus the Well  Founded model  may be accepted as a 
partially definite view of  the world,  and the other extended stable models as 
alternative extended consistent views of the world.
The original contributions of this paper are: showing that Well Founded Semantics is 
useful for representing hypothetical reasoning problems; to present a framework  for 
representing always within the language itself:  definite,  default and generally 
applicable rules;  preference among defaults;  exceptions to rules;  exceptions to 
exceptions; abduction; and integrity constraints.
Introduction
Well Founded Semantics (WFS) [van Gelder et al. 1990] is adequate to capture 
hypothetical reasoning  if we interpret the well-founded model (WFM) of a 
program P as a (possibly incomplete) view of the world. Thus the WFM may be 
accepted to be a view of the world and the extended stable models (XSMs) being 
extended alternative consistent views of the world, all of each containing the 
WFM. A world view may be completed (or refined) by hypothesizing (e.g. 
abducing, using default rules, etc.) about unknown information. Przymusinski 
[Przymusinski 1988; Przymusinski 1989a; Przymusinski 1989b] shows that well-
founded semantics is also equivalent to suitable forms of four major 
formalizations of non-monotonic reasoning (Circumscription, Closed World 
Assumption, Autoepistemic Logic and Default Logic). An attractive aspect is that 
well-founded semantics is defined for the class of all logic programs, the WFM 
being a minimal one.
In case the WFM is a 2-value model then no degree of freedom is left to the agent 
to conjecture or hypothesize about the world. If the WFM is 3-valued, hypothetical 
reasoning is then delimited by the unknown facts of the WFM. We have devised 
procedures for XSM semantics and WFM semantics [Pereira et al. 1990c; Pereira 
et al. 1990e]. For a practical introduction to WFS c.f. [Pereira et al. 1990a]. For 
additional examples c.f. [Pereira et al. 1990d].
Technically it seems a nice approach to interpret hypothesizing as searching 
XSMs restricted to some conditions. We will show that asking if A is true when we 
may abduce B, maps into the process of searching for XSMs where A is true, 
whenever B is true. On the other hand, other interesting problems appear as 
finding the minimal change so that A becomes true. With the well-founded model 
being the intersection of XSMs, WF semantics seems a rather natural 3-valued 
extension to capture richer notions of entailment.
Our main original contribution is to present a framework  for representing always 
within the language itself most of the mechanisms used in hypothetical reasoning 
(namely: definite, default and generally applicable rules; preference among 
defaults; exceptions to rules; exceptions to exceptions; abduction; and integrity 
constraints). Another important original contribution is to show that the Well 
Founded Semantics is useful for representing hypothetical reasoning problems.
We will begin by giving a definition of WF Model Semantics for logic programs 
with classical negation. Next we propose a representation of hierarchical 
taxonomies in these semantics. In the section "Possible worlds" we represent 
hypothetical reasoning problems and interpret the results. Based on these results 
we define abduction within the WF semantics and establish a relationship 
between it and the XS Models. Then we systematize the representation 
methodology used in the above sections. After this we show how to deal with 
integrity constraints, and finally we draw additional comparisons with other work.
1. The Well Founded Semantics
There are two main motivations for this section. First, it makes the paper self-
contained; second, it makes possible for the reader to confirm the results 
presented.
A reader familiarized with these semantics, or simply trusting that the models 
presented in the examples are correct and not caring much about their actual 
construction, can skip this section and proceed directly to section 2.
1.1. The Extended Stable Model Semantics
Here we will characterize the Extended Stable Model Semantics, as in 
[Przymusinska et al. 1990], which are an extension to the Stable Model 
Semantics (SMS) of [Gelfond et al. 1988]. Since the semantics are 3-valued, we 
begin by defining 3-valued interpretations.
Definition (3-valued interpretation)
By a 3-valued Herbrand interpretation I of a language L we mean any pair <T;F>, 
where T and F are disjoint subsets of the Herbrand base H. The set T contains all 
ground atoms true in I, the set F contains all ground atoms false in I and the truth 
value of the remaining atoms, in U = H - (T U F), is unknown (or undefined). o
An alternative way to represent an interpretation I = <T;F> is I = T U {~L|L  F}. This 
is the representation used throughout the paper.
Proposition (Interpretations as functions)
Any interpretation I = <T;F> can be equivalently viewed as a function I: HV  where 
V = {0, 1/2, 1}, defined by:
• I(A) = 0 if A  F
• I(A) = 1/2 if A  U
• I(A) = 1 if A  T o
Definition (truth valuation)
The function I: HV can be recursively extended to the truth valuation function Î: 
LitV defined on the set Lit of all literals of the language.
Given an interpretation I: HV then the truth valuation Î corresponding to I is a 
function Î: LitV , as follows, where A is a ground atom:
• Î(A) = I(A).
• Î(~A) = 1 - I(A). o
Definition (Non-negative program)
By a non-negative program we mean a logic program whose premises are either 
positive atoms or the special proposition u. We assume that every interpretation  I 
satisfies I(u) = 1/2  and thus Î(~u) = 1/2. This special proposition denotes 
unknown or undefined. o
Theorem (Generalization of [van Emden et al. 1976])
Every non-negative logic program  has a unique least 3-valued model. o
Next we define the program transformation P/M (P modulo M), which is an 
extension to the GL-transformation defined in [Gelfond et al. 1988].
Definition (Modulo transformation) [Przymusinska et al. 1990]
Let P be a logic program and let I be a 3-valued interpretation. By the extended 
GL-transformation of P modulo I we mean a new (non-negative) program P/I 
obtained from P by performing the following three operations:
• Removing from P all rules which contain a negative premise L = ~A such 
that Î(L) = 0.
• Replacing in all remaining rules those negative  premises L = ~A which 
satisfy Î(L) = 1/2 by u.
• Removing from all the remaining rules those negative L = ~A which satisfy 
Î(L) = 1. o
Since the resulting program P/I is non-negative, by theorem 4.2 it has a unique 
least 3-valued model. We define Γ*(I) (a generalization of the Γ operator [Gelfond 
et al. 1988]) to be the 3-valued least model of P/I.
Definition (Extended Stable Model)
A 3-valued interpretation I of a logic program P is called an Extended Stable 
Model of P iff Γ*(I) = I. o
These semantics were proved equivalent to the WF Semantics, in [Przymusinska 
et al. 1990] with the following theorem:
Theorem  [Przymusinska et al. 1990]
The Well Founded Model of a program P is the F-least Extended Stable Model of 
P. Consequently the WFS coincides with the XSMS. o
To obtain a constructive definition of the WFM  of a program P, we use the 
following sequence of {Iα} of interpretations of P:
• I0 = <{},{}>.
•Iα+1 = Γ*(Iα).
The WF Model of P is the fixed point of this sequence, i.e. Iλ [Przymusinska et al. 
1990].
1.2. Introducing classical negation [Przymusinski 1990]
The 3-valued stable model semantics can be extended to programs with 
classical negation, by using a simple program transformation:
• First, we denote all classically negated (ground) literals ¬A by a new atomic 
symbol, say, A' and make a suitable substitution everywhere in the program P. As 
result we obtain a standard program P* without classical negation.
• Then for any 3-valued stable model M* of the transformed program P* (in 
particular, for the well-founded model) we define the corresponding 3-valued 
stable model M of the extended program P as follows:
- If A (resp. A') is true in M*, then we take A (resp. ¬A) to be true in M.
- If A (resp. A') is false in M*, then we take ~A (resp. ~(¬A)) to be true in M, 
i.e., we view A (resp. ¬A) as false by default.
- Otherwise, if A (resp. A') is unknown in M*, then we consider the status 
of A (resp. ¬A) in M as also unknown.
• We throw out all contradictory  models M, i.e., those containing both A and ¬A, 
for some atom A.
2. Hierarchy Representation
In this section we will illustrate how to represent a hierarchy in extended logic 
programs with the above semantics. In this representation we wish to express 
general rules, and their exceptions, as well as exceptions to exceptions, these 
exceptions being possible general rules in the sense that they might be defeated. 
So, for instance, we want to represent general rules such as "birds normally fly" 
and "penguins normally don't fly" where the latter can act as an exception to the 
former, and vice-versa, given that penguins are (always) birds. Furthermore, we 
wish to be able to express preference for one rule over another in case they 
conflict and are both applicable. Thus in case of multiple extensions, we can 
prefer the most specific information (e.g. for a penguin, which is a bird we want to 
conclude that it doesn't fly, unless there is even more specific information).
Our presentation is made step by step using the well known "Birds Fly" 
hierarchical taxonomy.
2.1. One level hierarchy
Let us begin with the simplest version of this problem:
Normally birds fly.
What we want is a rule flies(X)  bird(X)  that applies whenever possible, but can 
be defeated by exceptions. These exceptions can be made, both by explicit 
exception to the conclusion predicate (flies) and by a weaker exception made 
only to the rule. In other words we want to be able to say that a given bird doesn't 
fly and also that for a given bird this rule doesn't apply.
In order to allow exceptions on the conclusions, we must say that a bird flies only 
if there is no evidence that it doesn't. So:
flies(X)  bird(X), ~ ¬flies(X)
To allow exceptions to the rule, we have to name that rule:
( flies(X)  bird(X), ~ ¬flies(X) )  bird_flies(X).
which is equivalent to:
flies(X)  bird(X), ~ ¬flies(X), bird_flies(X). (1)
To capture the notion that the rule applies whenever possible we introduce the 
rule:
bird_flies(X)  ~ ¬bird_flies(X). (2)
which with (1)  captures the notion that if there is no way to prove that an object is 
an exception to the rule, then assume that the rule applies.
¬bird_flies(X) represents an exception to bird_flies(X). By renaming ¬bird_flies
(X) to McCarthy's abnormal_bird(X) [McCarthy 1987], then from (1) and (2) there 
follow the clauses:
flies(X)  bird(X), ~ abnormal_bird(X). and
abnormal_bird(X)   ¬ flies(X).
We prefer having rule (2), it being a modular statement of an assumption about a 
predicate.
Note also that (2) can be seen as a closed world assumption about ¬bird_flies
(X).
Abridging, we represent the "birds fly" taxonomy with the program:
∏1: f(X)  b(X), ~ ¬f(X), bf(X).
bf(X)  ~¬bf(X).
where f  stands for flies, b  for bird and bf  for bird_flies.
Let us see what are the Extended Stable Models (XSM) of ∏1 if we add to it the 
facts:
Facts1: b(a). b(b). ¬f(b).
∏1  ≈  Facts1  has a unique XS Model coinciding with the Well Founded Model 
(WF), which is :
WF = { f(a), ~ ¬f(a), ¬f(b), ~f(b), 
b(a), b(b),
bf(a), ~ ¬bf(a), bf(b),~ ¬bf(b)}
The fact that this model is 2-valued reflects that no choices are available to obtain 
other XSMs. This seems quite an acceptable result. Regarding b  we know for 
sure that it is a bird and it doesn't fly. We can say that the rule might apply, 
because there are no exceptions defined for it. For a we know that it is a bird, and 
as there are no possible exception for flies, when X is bound to a, we can say for 
sure that it flies. Thus the birds fly rule is applied maximally, as default rules are.
This problem domain can be extended by saying that all penguins are birds, 
penguins don't fly, and b is a penguin. 
2.2. Exceptions to exceptions
In a hierarchy, instead of saying that "penguins don't fly", we would like to say that 
normally  penguins don't fly. This will allow us to express an exception to an 
exception rule of birds fly, and hence the possibility that a given exceptional 
penguin may fly.
So the problem statement now is:
Normally birds fly.
Penguins are birds.
Normally penguins don't fly.
According to what was said before this problem is represented as:
∏2: f(X)  b(X), ~ ¬f(X), bf(X). % Normally birds fly
bf(X)  ~¬bf(X).
¬f(X)  p(X), ~ f(X), pnf(X). % Normally penguins don't fly
pnf(X)  ~ ¬pnf(X).
b(X)  p(X). % Penguins are birds
where p  stands for penguin and pnf  stands for penguin_not_flies.
With this program, we will consider two birds, one of them being a penguin:
Facts2: b(a). p(b).
The WF Model of ∏2 ≈ Facts2 is:
WF = { f(a), ~¬f(a), bf(a), ~¬bf(a), pnf(a), ~¬pnf(a), b(a), ~p(a),
bf(b), ~¬bf(b),  pnf(b), ~¬pnf(b), b(b),    p(b) }
About a everything is defined, and we are exactly at the same case as before.
About b this model only tells us that it is a bird and a penguin, leaving predicates 
flies and ¬flies undefined. This is due to the fact that there are two exception rule 
that might apply, each of which inhibits the conclusion of the other. So nothing 
can be said for sure about b flying or not.
But the program has two more XS Models:
XSM1 = WF ≈ { f(b), ~ ¬f(b)}
XSM2 = WF ≈ { ¬f(b), ~f(b) }
These models can be seen as different models (i.e. consistent beliefs) an agent 
may have of the world. This is a quite intuitive result, since we can believe that b 
flies (because it is a bird) or that it doesn't (because it is a penguin). The WF 
Model is the intersection of these two, and intuitively gives us our real world, the 
things we believe unconditionally, and where nothing can be said about b flying 
or not. This topic will be further detailed in the sequel.
In a hierarchy however, since we always want to apply the most specific 
information, there should be an explicit preference between the rules bird_flies 
and penguin_not_flies, which establishes the properties that in a hierarchy a 
property is either true or false for an individual in a taxonomy.
Having rules named, this preference is quite easy to represent. What we want to 
say is that if we can apply the rule penguin_not_flies to a penguin we are in 
presence of an exception to the bird_flies rule. So the preference rule is simply:
¬bf(X)  p(X), pnf(X).
With this rule the only XS Model is the WF Model:
WF = { f(a) , ~¬f(a),   bf(a), ~¬bf(a), pnf(a), ~¬pnf(a), b(a), ~p(a),
¬f(b), ~ f(b) , ¬bf(b),   ~ bf(b), pnf(b), ~¬pnf(b), b(b),    p(b) }
which expresses the intuitive notions about the hierarchy. b doesn't fly and is an 
exception to bird_flies rule.
Now we can represent exceptions to exceptions:
Facts3: f(X)  fp(X). % Flying penguins fly
p(X)  fp(X). % Flying penguins are penguins
fp(c). % c is a flying penguin
where fp is short for flying_penguin.
The WF Model of ∏2 ≈ Facts3 is:
WF = { f(c), ~ ¬f(c), ¬bf(c), ~ bf(c), pnf(c), ~ ¬pnf(c), b(c), p(c), fp(c) }
Note that c is also an exception to the bird_flies rule. Nevertheless it flies, but 
because of the more specific and absolute rule that flying penguins fly.
2.3. A More Complex Hierarchy
For better exemplifying our representation of hierarchies, and the results 
obtained in them, we will illustrate it on a more complex example.





Dead animals are animals.
Normally animals don't fly.
Normally bats fly.
Normally birds fly.
Normally penguins don't fly.
Dead animals don't fly.
Pluto is a mammal
Tweety is a bird.
Joe is a penguin.
Jack is a bat.
Jack is a dead animal.
Our representation of this is the program:
∏3: animal(X)  mammal(X). % Mammals are animals.
mammal(X)  bat(X). % Bats are mammals
animal(X)  bird(X). % Birds are animals.
bird(X)  penguin(X). % Penguins are birds.
animal(X)  dead_animal(X). % Dead animals are animals.
¬flies(X)  animal(X),~flies(X), anf(X).   % Normally animals don't fly.
anf(X)  ~ ¬anf(X).
flies(X)  bat(X), ~ ¬flies(X), btf(X).     % Normally bats fly.
btf(X)  ~ ¬btf(X).
flies(X)  bird(X), ~ ¬flies(X), bf(X).     % Normally birds fly.
bf(X)  ~ ¬bf(X).
¬flies(X)  penguin(X),~flies(X),pnf(X). %Normally penguins don't fly.
pnf(X)  ~ ¬pnf(X).
¬flies(X)  dead_animal(X). % Dead animals don't fly.
mammal(pluto). % Pluto is a mammal
bird(tweety). % Tweety is a bird.
penguin(joe ). % Joe is a penguin.
bat(jack). % Jack is a bat.
dead_animal(jack). % Jack is a dead animal.
% Preference rules
¬anf(X)  bat(X), btf(X).
¬anf(X)  bird(X), bf(X).
¬bf(X)  penguin(X), pnf(X).
As expected, this program has exactly one XS Model (coinciding with the WF 
Model), no choice being possible and everything being defined in the hierarchy. 







Thus pluto doesn't fly, and isn't exception to any of the rules; tweety flies because 
it's a bird and an exception to the "animals don't fly" rule; joe doesn't fly because 
it's a penguin and an exception to the "birds fly" rule and finally jack doesn't fly 
because it is dead. Note that jack is an exception to the "animals don't fly" rule, 
being expected to fly. But as it's dead, and as the "dead animals don't fly" rule 
can't be exceptioned, it overrides the "bats fly" rule. Note also that the "dead 
animals don't fly" rule  doesn't interfere unless we have a dead_animal.
3. Possible worlds
In hierarchies, as seen, everything is defined, leaving no choices available. This 
is not the case for general hypothetical reasoning problems. 
In the next section we represent hypothetical reasoning problems in the 
Extended Stable Models Semantics and we interpret the results.
3.1. The "Nixon diamond" problem
Let us look now at another well known problem:
Normally quakers are pacifists.(1)
Normally republicans are hawks. (2)
Pacifists are non hawks.
Hawks are non pacifists.
Nixon is quaker and republican.
If we represent this example as before  the names of rules (1) and (2) are in the 
well founded model, leaving no possibility of choice between them. This was 
correct when we had a hierarchy and there was always an explicit preference 
between rules. In this problem that is not the case.
Here, as there is no explicit preference, we don't want a rule to be maximally 
applicable (in the sense that it is true whenever possible). Instead we wish to 
choose between having or not the rule applied.
In hierarchies quaker_pacifist(X)  ~ ¬quaker_pacifist(X) (C1) expresses that rule 
(1) is true whenever possible. We must have a clause for saying that rule (1) is 
not true whenever possible, leaving this way freedom to apply or not the rule. 
This clause is clearly:
¬quaker_pacifist(X)  ~ quaker_pacifist(X). (C2)
These two clauses (C1 and C2) forces the name of the rule (quaker_pacifist), and 
consequently its conclusion, to be unknown in the Well Founded Model. 
According to this, our representation of the "Nixon diamond" problem is as 
follows:
% Normally quakers are pacifists
pacifist(X)  quaker(X), quaker_pacifist(X).
quaker_pacifist(X)  ~ ¬quaker_pacifist(X).
¬quaker_pacifist(X)  ~ quaker_pacifist(X).
% Normally republicans are hawks
hawk(X)  republican(X), republican_hawk(X).
republican_hawk(X)  ~ ¬republican_hawk(X).
¬republican_hawk(X)  ~ republican_hawk(X).
¬hawk(X)  pacifist(X). % Pacifists are non hawks
¬ pacifist(X)  hawk(X). % Hawks are non pacifists
quaker(nixon). % Nixon is a quaker.
republican(nixon). % Nixon is a republican.
The WF Model of this program is:
WF = { quaker(nixon), republican(nixon) }
and the other consistent XS Models are:
XSM1 =  { pacifist(nixon), ¬hawk(nixon), quaker(nixon), republican(nixon),
quaker_pacifist(nixon), ¬republican_hawk(nixon) }
XSM2 = { ¬pacifist(nixon), hawk(nixon), quaker(nixon), republican(nixon),
¬quaker_pacifist(nixon), republican_hawk(nixon) }
XSM3 = { quaker(nixon), republican(nixon),
¬quaker_pacifist(nixon), ¬republican_hawk(nixon) }
We interpret the WF Model as being what is taken for certain in our view of the 
real world, i.e. all things we believe unconditionally. In this we are not able to 
conclude anything about nixon being pacifist or hawk.
The remaining XS Models can be seen as possible extended world views in 
which some choices of belief have been made. So XSM1  represents a world 
where nixon is pacifist and non hawk, by choosing to apply the rule 
quaker_pacifist and not  to apply the republican_hawk one; XSM2 represents a 
world where nixon is hawk and non pacifist, by choosing to apply the rule 
republican_hawk and not  to apply the quaker_pacifist one; XSM3  is a world 
where we choose not to apply any of the rules, so that we can prove nothing 
about nixon being a pacifist or a hawk. 
The interpretation of the above results, in particular in what concerns XSM's 
where literals not in the WF model are true, suggested to us a relationship 
between XS Models of a program with rules like (1) and (2) and a notion of 
abduction within WF Semantics. This relationship will be explored latter in this 
paper in section 5.
3.2. Salvador's problem
For a better understanding of the proposed representation let us look now at the 
following example:
Someone is saved by Salvador unless that someone saves himself. (1)
Someone is not saved by Salvador unless that someone does not save 
himself. (2)
John saves himself and Mary doesn't.
John saves Peter.
As proposed above, this problem should be represented as:
% Someone is saved by Salvador.
saves(salvador,X)   salv_saves(X), ~ ¬saves(salvador,X).
salv_saves(X) ~ ¬salv_saves(X).
¬salv_saves(X)  ~ salv_saves(X).
% Someone is not saved by Salvador.
¬saves(salvador,X)  ¬salv_saves(X), ~ saves(salvador,X).
% Those who save themselves are an exception to the second rule
¬salv_saves(X)  saves(X,X).
% Those who don't save themselves are an exception to the first rule
salv_saves(X)  ¬saves(X,X).
saves(john,john). % John does save himself.
¬saves(mary,mary).% Mary doesn't save herself.
saves(john,peter). % John saves Peter.
The WF Model of this program is:
{saves(salvador,mary),salv_saves(mary),~¬saves(salvador,mary),~¬salv_saves(mary),
¬saves(salvador,john),¬salv_saves(john), ~saves(salvador,john),    ~salv_saves(john),
¬saves(mary,mary), saves(john,john), saves(john,peter) }
Note that there are some atoms undefined in the WF Model (namely, saves
(salvador,salvador), salv_saves(salvador), saves(salvador,peter), salv_saves
(peter), etc). Only two additional XS Models exist: one containing saves
(salvador,peter), and another containing ¬saves(salvador,peter). In both, saves
(salvador,salvador) remains undefined.
4. Abduction within Well Founded Semantics
We will begin by giving a definition of abduction within WF Semantics very similar 
to the ones given for classical logic in [Eshghi et al. 1989], [Kakas et al. 1988], 
[Pereira et al. 1990b]. Finally we present a theorem that relates the XS Models of 
a modified program with the abduction within the WF Semantics of the original 
program.
Definition :  We define Lit(P) as being the set of all literals appearing in the 
program P, which are not of the form ~L.
Definition : An abductive theory is pair < P, Ab > where P is a program and Ab is 
a set of literals in Lit(P).
Ab is the set of all literals we are prepared to assume if that contributes to prove 
some goal. We call these literals the abducible literals.
Definition :  For a given abductive theory < P, Ab >, a subset S of Ab whose 
elements are not in the WF Model of P is an abductive solution for literal L iff  L is 
in the WF Model of P ≈ S.
Since WF Models are always consistent by definition, we have no need to 
impose consistency.
Example 1:
< { p  q, ¬p  r, p  r }, { q, r } > is an abductive theory with one abductive solutions 
for literal p namely {q}.o
Now that we have defined abduction within WF Semantics, we define a 
modification of a given program based on the abducible literals, and then 
establish results between the XS Models of the modified program (abducing 
program) and abductive solutions in the original one.
Definition : An abducing program for an abductive theory < P, Ab > is a program 
obtained by adding to P, for all literals L in Ab, two clauses of the form:
L  ~ ¬L. and ¬L  ~ L.
Example 2:
The program:
p  q. ¬p  r. p  r.
q  ~ ¬q. ¬q  ~ q.
r  ~ ¬r. ¬r  ~ r.
is the abducing program for the theory in example 1.o
Theorem :  S is an abductive solution for L in an abductive theory < P, Ab > iff all 
XS Models of the abducing program for the theory that contain S also contain L. 
This provides a technique for performing abductive inference, namely by 
considering the XS models where some desired conclusion holds.
Example 3:
The abducing program of example 2 has three XS Models:
XSM1 = { } 
XSM2 = { ~p, ~ ¬p, ¬q, ~q, ¬r, ~r }
XSM3 = { p, ~ ¬p, q, ~ ¬q, ¬r, ~ ¬r }
The abductive solution for p in the corresponding original program of example 1 
can be readily found by applying the above theorem to these models. For 
instance, in all models where q is present (XSM3), p is also present.o
Example 4:
In the Salvador's problem (section 3.2) salv_saves(peter) is an abductive solution 
for saves(salvador,peter). o
5. Integrity constraints
Definition : An integrity constraint is a logical formula of the form  IC, where IC is 
a conjunction of literals.
Definition : A set of integrity constraints is satisfied by a model of a program P iff 
none is false in the model (i.e. each is true or undefined).
Since we allow for facts with classical negation, we may transform each integrity 
constraint  IC into ⊥  IC and add to the program the fact ¬ ⊥, where ⊥ is a new 
predicate name.
Theorem :  M is a model of the new program iff M - { ¬ ⊥  } is a model of the 
original program satisfying the integrity constraints.
6. Summary of our representation method
In this section we summarize and systematize the representation method 
adopted in all the above examples. The type of rules for which we propose a 
representation is, in our view, general enough to capture a wide domain of 
hypothetical reasoning problems.
Each type of rule is described in a subsection by means of a schema in natural 
language and its corresponding representation schema .
6.1. Definite Rules
If A then B. The representation is: B  A.
6.2. Definite Facts
A is true. The representation is:  A.
6.3. Default (or maximally applicable) Rules
Normally if A then B. The representation is:
B  A, name_A_B, ~ ¬B.
name_A_B  ~ ¬name_A_B .
where name_A_B  is a predicate symbol that "names" this rule only. Its has 
arguments are those arguments in A or B.
We will consider Default Facts  as a special case of Default Rules  where A  is 
absent.
As an example consider the rule "Normally birds fly". Its representation is:
fly(X)  bird(X), bird_flies(X), ~ ¬fly(X).
bird_flies(X)  ~ ¬bird_flies(X).
6.4. Abduction Rules
 Rule "If A then B" may or may not be abduced. Its representation is:
B  A, name_A_B, ~ ¬B.
name_A_B  ~ ¬name_A_B .
¬ name_A_B  ~ name_A_B .
where name_A_B  is a predicate symbol that "names" the first rule only. Its 
arguments are all those arguments in A or B.
As an example consider the rule "Quakers might be pacifists". Its representation 
is:
pacifist(X)  quaker(X), quaker_pacifist(X), ~ ¬pacifist(X).
quaker_pacifist(X)  ~ ¬quaker_pacifist(X).
¬quaker_pacifist(X)  ~ quaker_pacifist(X).
6.5. Exceptions to Default Rule
Under certain conditions COND there are exceptions to the default rule named 
NAME.
¬NAME  COND.
As an example, the representation of the exception "Penguins are exceptions to 
"normally birds fly" rule" is:
¬bird_flies(X)  penguin(X).
6.6. Preference Rules
Under conditions COND, prefer to apply the default rule NAME+ instead of the 
default rule named NAME-.
¬NAME-  COND, NAME+.
As an example consider "For penguins if the rule that says that "normally 
penguins don't fly" is applicable then inhibit "normally birds fly" rule". This is 
represented as:
¬ bird_flies(X)  penguin(X), penguins_no_flies(X).
6.7. Integrity constraints
It is not possible to have COND1, …, CONDn simultaneously.
⊥  COND1, …, CONDn.
As an example consider "No one can fly and not fly at the same time".
⊥  fly(X), ¬fly(X).
7. Comparisons with other work using non-classical 
semantics of logic programs
7.1. Logic Programs With Exceptions [Kowalski et al. 1989]
Above is shown how we represent and solve the “rules with exceptions” 
examples presented in [Kowalski et al. 1989].
The following distinctions seem to apply:
• We deal with exceptions to exceptions in a uniform and modular way. Because 
of its inherent asymmetry, the “rules with exceptions” approach requires 
changing previous clauses in the program each time an exception to an 
exception is made, because head literals need to change. For instance, a three 





¬ fly(X)  nofly(X)
¬ nofly(X)  flying_penguin(X)
• We allow both positive and negative conclusions in rules, inclusively for the 
same predicate.
• The extension of well-founded semantics to classical negation provides a (non 
contradictory) well-founded model of definite conclusions in cases where e-
answer set semantics provides only alternative models. For instance, in the 
pacifist/hawk example we obtain a well-founded model containing the facts 
{quaker, republican}, besides the two alternative e-answer sets. This additional 
model is, by design, the intersection of the other two.
• Of course, the use of well-founded semantics also provides a richer variety of 
answers, given its three-valued nature.
• By introducing “name predicates“ in rules, we have shown how to express 
exceptions to rules, rather than exceptions to whole predicates, and how to 
express preference amongst rules. This technique can be imported into the “rules 
with exceptions” approach, but then why distinguish between rules and 
exceptions? Thus our approach appears more uniform.
7.2. Generalized Stable Models [Kakas et al. 1989]
Above, we have shown how a literal P can be made abducible by directly 
introducing into a program the two rules P  ~ ¬P and ¬P  ~P. It follows that each 
extended stable model of a program shows which abducible literals may be 
consistently added to the program to make that particular model the new well-
founded one. This provides a technique for performing abductive inference, 
namely by considering the extended stable models where some desired 
conclusion holds and making it the new well-founded one.
We have also shown how we can deal with integrity constraints.
Thus, compared to Generalized Stable Models, we can observe that:
• Our approach can deal with the class of problems of GSM.
• The three-valued semantics subsumes the two-valued semantics of GSM and, 
additionally, allows the use of classical negation.
• Abducibility, and preference among abducibles, are both expressible as rules in 
our language, but not so in the GSM approach.
7.3. Answer-set Semantics [Gelfond et al. 1990]
• The three-valued semantics subsumes the two-valued semantics of answer-set 
semantics.
• We have developed top-down procedures to compute our three-valued 
extended stable models comprising classical negations. These procedures are 
parametrizable to compute the two-valued special case of answer-sets.
• The techniques for hypothetical reasoning we've presented are in part 
adoptable by the answer-set semantics of extended logic programs.
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